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NOTE
UNITED STATES V. SUTTON: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CURBS ABUSE OF RICO, THE FEDERAL
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE STATUTE*
I. INTRODUCTION
R ICO,' THE CONTROVERSIAL ANTI-RACKETEERING STATUTE, takes its
name from the acronym for "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations," the heading under which the statute appears in the
United States Code. The statute has come under persistent attack from
defendants and commentators for its overbreadth and potential for
abuse, yet the courts and federal prosecutors continue to hail it as an
essential weapon against organized crime.
At the hub of any RICO offense is the "enterprise." Loosely defined
as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity,"2 the "enterprise" element has been at
the center of the controversy concerning the statute's scope.3 Prior to
the decision in United States v. Sutton,' the five circuit courts of appeal
considering RICO's scope were in agreement that the statute applied to
"enterprises" acquired or conducted for wholly illegitimate purposes,5
* Editor's Note: As of this printing, the case of United States v. Sutton is
still pending in the Sixth Circuit, rehearing en banc. Recently, the Eighth Circuit
has followed a line of reasoning similar to Sutton. United States v. Anderson, 27
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2518 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 1980). With these two circuits in con-
flict with the other five circuits previously considering the scope of RICO, the
path seems to be clear to a final resolution of the issue before the United States
Supreme Court.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976).
Id. § 1961(4).
The meaning of "enterprise" has been the single most litigated issue involv-
ing the RICO statute. As of this writing, twenty-four reported cases have con-
sidered the scope of "enterprise."
4 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated pending rehearing en banc, Nos.
78-5134 through 78-5139, 78-5141 through 78-5143 and 78-5074 (6th Cir. Nov. 7,
1979).
5 United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swider-
ski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States
v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Delph v. United States,
439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom., Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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e.g. illegal gambling operations,6 prostitution rings,7 or loansharking
operations In Sutton, however, a panel for the Sixth Circuit severely
limited RICO's application to enterprises "organized and acting for
some ostensibly lawful purpose."9 Thus, by a two-to-one vote, the panel
created a conflict among the circuits by requiring some showing that
the enterprise in question affected legitimate business before RICO
could be invoked. Three months after the Sutton decision, the Justice
Department successfully petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the
original judgment and opinion were vacated pursuant to Sixth Circuit
Rule 14.10 The parties were directed to file supplemental briefs for the
rehearing scheduled during the February, 1980 session.11
The full impact of the restrictive holding in Sutton does not manifest
itself without examination of the operative facts. In Sutton, the nine
defendants were convicted by a jury on an indictment containing 329
counts. Each defendant was convicted on a substantive RICO count of
conducting an "enterprise" affecting interstate commerce through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity12 and on a conspiracy count to commit that
offense.13 In addition, each defendant was convicted on one or more of
the following offenses committed during the operation of the "enter-
prise": possession and distribution of heroin," mail fraud," receiving and
transporting stolen property," various firearms offenses, and use of a
telephone to facilitate illicit drug sales. 8
6 See, e.g.,United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
' See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
' See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
" 605 F.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
10 6TH CIR. R. 14 provides: ".... The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc
shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this court, to stay the
mandate and to restore the case on the docket as a pending appeal."
1 United States v. Sutton, Nos. 78-5134 through 78-5139, 78-5141 through
78-5143 and 78-5074 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1979) (order granting rehearing en banc).
12 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. (emphasis added).
13 Id. § 1962(d) (1976). Section 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of
this section."
14 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (1976).
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) and (h) (1976).
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1976).
[Vol. 28:629
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The government's evidence revealed an elaborate network of criminal
activity with each defendant assuming a specialized role, a
characteristic typical of organized crime. The "enterprise," described as
a "virtual department store of crime,"19 had Carl Sutton serving as the
main actor in a narcotics distribution business bankrolled by Herschel
Weintraub. Weintraub, who was not tried in the Sutton prosecution,
also financed a fencing operation for stolen property conducted by
defendants Adams and Hensley. On occasion, Adams sold the stolen
goods from his jewelry store which served as an outlet or "front." The
stolen property, mostly household goods, was supplied by various
burglary rings. In addition, Hensley participated in an insurance fraud
scheme whereby the defrauded companies received falsified receipts for
goods allegedly stolen from Hensley's home. The insurance proceeds
were then used to purchase narcotics. Other defendants assumed lesser
roles in the organization, for the most part engaged in procuring and
selling narcotics. In sum, the government's theory relied upon the inter-
relationship of the individual offenses and their total net effect to prove
the existence of a "criminal enterprise.''20
On appeal, the defendants launched a paradoxical but successful at-
tack on their RICO convictions. After analyzing the statutory language
and the legislative history, the defendants asserted that RICO was in-
19 605 F.2d at 274 (Engel, J., dissenting).
Throughout the Sutton prosecution, the government referred to the defend-
ants' organization as a "criminal enterprise," a term consistent with the inter-
pretation of other circuits that RICO applies to wholly illegal ventures. See 605
F.2d at 263. To illustrate the structured nature of the defendants' "criminal
enterprise," it is possible to compile a line-staff organizational chart. (The prin-
cipal's name appears beneath his "office" and the broken line indicates part-time
activities.):
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE, INC.
Treasurer/Comptroller President of Sales
(Weintraub) (Sutton)
Purchasing Agent-Drugs Purchasing Agent-Goods Sales Department
(Holmes) (Adams & Hensley)
Stolen Goods Drugs
Supply Clerks Supply Clerks (Adams & Hensley) -- 0 (Craven,
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tended to prohibit "only the [criminal] infiltration and operation of
legitimate enterprises through patterns of racketeering activity."'"
They argued that because the "enterprise" was conducted for wholly il-
legitimate purposes, the RICO statute was not applicable. The obvious
conclusion drawn from this argument is that so long as the defendants
could prove their activities were illegal and totally unrelated to
legitimate business, they were exempt from the statute's prohibitions.
At first blush, this argument appears absurd, but it was accepted by
the Sutton majority and serves as the basis for the court's initial rever-
sal of the RICO convictions.2 2 It also provides the foundation for the
court's restrictive holding that a legitimate business, a "front," is an in-
dispensable prerequisite to the invocation of RICO.'
The Sutton decision poses many questions. In a case where the
presence of organized crime is evident, why did the majority so severely
limit the anti-racketerring statute's application so that its target, organ-
ized crime, was beyond its purview? Also, why did the majority allow the
confession of illegality to serve as a defense to liability under a criminal
statute? Lastly, why did the majority hold contrary to five other cir-
cuits and require a showing of legitimacy where the statutory definition
of "enterprise" does not specifically require it? This note will attempt to
answer these questions. It will examine RICO's intended use as stated
by Congress and its expanded use as applied by federal prosecutors. It
will finally conclude that the single most debilitating aspect of the
statute is its inherent potential for abuse, an aspect of RICO implicitly
controlling the Sutton majority.
21 605 F.2d at 264 (emphasis added).
I The cases were remanded for separate trials on the substantive drug, mail
fraud, stolen property, and firearms counts. Although each defendant was con-
victed of one or more of the drug counts, only defendant Hensley participated in
the full gamut of related offenses. A joint trial of all defendants would be proper
only if all were participants "in the same series of acts or transactions con-
stituting an offense or offenses." FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). The majority reasoned that
reversal of the RICO counts destroyed the requisite nexus between defendants
and offenses. Therefore, without a single "enterprise" to bind the group, they
could not be participants in the "same series" of acts. 605 F.2d at 270-71.
In dissent, Judge Engel accepted this reasoning, however he felt that this
type of retroactive misjoinder did not warrant reversal of the substantive counts
without showing prejudice to the defendants. See Schaffer v. United States, 362
U.S. 511 (1960). The district judge had ruled on joinder of parties, severing the
trial of Charles Thomas Hill, but refusing severance for the other defendants
since sufficient prejudice in joinder was not indicated. By accepting the district
judge's ruling, the dissent considers the prejudicial effect of joinder a question
fully answered by the trial court, and hence not open for re-examination. 605 F.2d
at 274 (Engel, J., dissenting).
I3 The government conceded that the jewelry store owned by Adams and
operated as an outlet for stolen goods was not the "enterprise" charged in the in-
dictment. 605 F.2d at 264 n.1.
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II. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE "ENTERPRISE" ELEMENT
A. Background
RICO has been characterized as the "most sweeping criminal statute
ever passed by Congress."24 To understand RICO it is essential to con-
sider the atmosphere in which it was promulgated. Originally enacted as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,25 RICO was herald-
ed as "providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from
our organizations, prevention of their return, and, where possible,
forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains."2 From its beginning, then, RICO
was designed to be a substantive and affirmative weapon against
racketeering.
Prior to the enactment of the Organized Crime Control Act, the need
for a comprehensive plan to combat organized crime had been recogniz-
ed. In the early 1950's, the hearings before the Special Senate Commit-
tee to Investigate Organized Crime, chaired by Senator Estes
Kefauver, 2 focused national attention on the threat posed by the
criminal underworld. In 1954, the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section of the Department of Justice was specifically formed to meet
this threat.28 Governmental investigations of the underworld
continued.' These efforts peaked in 1965 when President Johnson
24 Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1, 1 (1978).
" Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970), reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073.
1 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in Mc-
Clellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970) (emphasis added). In this article,
the late Senator McClellan, floorleader and principal draftsman of the Organized
Crime Control Act (OCCA), attempted to defend the then unenacted bill, S. 30.
Only a small portion of the article deals with RICO, but the article provides a
flavor for the other provisions of the OCCA.
" Hearings Before the Special Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in In-
terstate Commerce, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. and 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1950-51); S.
REP. No. 307, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
1 Note, The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime,
6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 496, 502 (1970). This note discusses the use of
specialized Strike Forces within the Department of Justice's Racketeering Sec-
tion. At present, the local Strike Forces are charged with implementing RICO,
subject to the constant supervision of the Justice Department. The Strike Force
concept has been praised as the most successful means of combatting organized
crime presently in practice. See Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime:
Highlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 41, 45 (1970).
See In re Subpoena of Persico, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975). This case includes
an extensive history and bibliography of the efforts to fight organized crime. In
addition, it points out the frustrations attendant in the prosecution of racketeers.
Persico was a reputed mobster subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury sit-
ting in the Eastern District of New York which was investigating the infiltration
19791
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created the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice. The Commission submitted a report containing
twenty-two recommendations directed solely toward the problem of
organized crime. These recommendations formed the basis for a long
needed comprehensive plan-the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.30
Throughout this twenty-year inquiry, it was shown that organized
crime did not confine its activities to wholly illegal ventures. In fact,
Congress recognized the subversion of legitimate business at an early
stage.3 ' The report of the Kefauver Committee listed fifty areas where
organized crime had infiltrated legitimate business.32
Since 1951, organized crime has become so pervasive that it is now
recognized that no endeavor is immune from its influence and control.
33
Due to the numerous sources of income and "laundering techniques"
available to organized crime, it is extremely difficult to determine the
dollar cost to society. A conservative estimate of seven to eight billion
dollars in annual profits from illegal gambling, narcotics, loansharking,
and prostitution has been offered.34 Much of this income is available for
investment in legitimate businesses to provide "fronts," or is used in an
effort to gain respectability, or simply because there is a great deal of
profit in obtaining a legitimate business and running it illegally. One
commentator analyzing the methodology and motivation of organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate business has discovered an almost sym-
biotic relationship; organized crime must dispose of its enormous profits
of legitimate businesses by organized crime in violation of RICO section 1962. In
spite of being given testimonial immunity, Persico refused to reveal the names of
the employees in his illegal gambling business. He was held in contempt of court
and sentenced to 60 days in jail. After serving his sentence, he was re-
subpoenaed to appear before the same grand jury. Again he was granted immuni-
ty and again he refused to testify. Once more he was found in contempt of court
and jailed for the remainder of the grand jury's term. After using every device
available, the government had failed to gain the desired information.
10 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, 16-24 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as T.F.R.]. It is apparent that at least five titles of the Organized Crime
Control Act are patterned directly after Task Force recommendations. Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1073; Compare: Title I (Special Grand Jury) with T.F.R. at 16; Title IV (False
Declarations) with T.F.R. at 17; Title V (Protected Facilities for Housing Govern-
ment Witnesses) with T.F.R. at 19; Title VII (Litigation Concerning Sources of
Evidence) with T.F.R. at 19; Title X (Special Offender Sentencing) with T.F.R. at
19.
" See S. REP. No. 307, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1951).
32 Id.
I Evidence indicates criminal infiltration of securities firms and the New
York Stock Exchange. S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1969).
' Wilson, supra note 28, at 42.
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in a "safe" manner while legitimate businesses require continuous in-
fluxes of new capital.3"
While most of the Organized Crime Control Act was concerned with
providing procedural tools for prosecutors, RICO was added as Title IX
to provide a substantive tool to prevent the criminal infiltration and cor-
ruption of legitimate business by racketeers.3" Most everyone is in
agreement that this is the principal purpose of RICO,3  but the consen-
sus ends there. Since RICO was part of a comprehensive plan to fight
organized crime, the natural tendency is to concentrate on the whole
(organized criminal activity) and forget the component part RICO was
designed to attack- infiltration of legitimate business. As a result,
federal prosecutors have expanded RICO's use into cases where
criminal involvement with legitimate business is totally lacking.3" The
question then becomes: Is RICO's purview limited solely to the criminal
infiltration and corruption of legitimate business, as it was apparently
intended, or does RICO apply to any case involving organized criminal
activity, regardless of its connection with legitimate business? This is
the essence of the RICO debate: The restrictive view symbolized by the
Sutton majority versus the expansionist view expressed by the prosecu-
tion and the Sutton dissent.
Obviously, there must be an ambiguity within the statute that would
result in such a fundamental disagreement. Therefore, it is only proper,
as the Sutton majority states, that an analysis of RICO's scope begin
with the statute itself. 9
See Jester, An Analysis of Organized Crime's Infiltration of Legitimate
Business, 5 CRIM. JUST. MONOGRAPH 1 (1979).
' Title IX was originally introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska as a
separate bill, The Corrupt Organizations Act. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
115 CONG. REC. 9566 (1969). Portions of S. 1861 were based on an earlier bill in-
troduced by Senator Hruska, The Criminal Activities Profits Act. S. 1623, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6992 (1969). S. 1861 was later incorporated as an
amendment into S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. S. 30 passed
through the Senate by an overwhelming vote of 73-1. 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970). S.
30 passed through the House by another huge majority, 341-26. 116 CONG. REC.
35363 (1970). President Nixon signed S. 30 into law on October 15, 1970. Part of
the overwhelming support the legislation enjoyed can be attributed to the fact
that 1970 was an election year; a vote against the bill would label the member as
"soft on crime," which was especially significant during the heyday of Nixon's law
and order years. For a concise history of S. 30, see 26 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 545
(1970).
37 Even in Sutton, the majority and dissent agree that RICO's primary aim
was to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. 605
F.2d at 267, 273. This fact is also impliedly accepted by the government. Peti-
tioner's Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 9, United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260
(6th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
See notes 191-213 infra and accompanying text.
, 605 F.2d at 264.
19791
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B. Statutory Construction
It has been traditionally recognized that there are four possible com-
binations of legitimate -illegitimate acquisition and operation of
businesses. "(1) Some businesses are legitimately purchased with the
fruits of crime and operated legitimately. (2) Others are legitmately pur-
chased with the fruits of crime and operated illegitimately. (3) A third
possibility involves illegitimate acquisition and legitimate operation....
(4) (T)he fourth alternative is to acquire a business illegitimately and
then to operate it illegitimately."4
The substantive section of RICO, section 1962, covers all of these
possibilities by dividing them into acquisition offenses and operating of-
fenses. Section 1962(a)4' is designed to prevent the legal investment of
ill-gotten gains, the first possibility.4'2 This section is the most difficult to
prove since it requires the tracing of illegally received funds. Note that
this particular section applies only to the acquisition of legitimate
"enterprises" since it is logically impossible to invest in an "illegitimate
enterprise."'43 Next, section 1962(b) 4 is designed to prevent the illegal ac-
4" D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION 100 (1969).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). Section 1962(a) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or in-
directly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in ac-
quisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, in-
terstate or foreign commerce.
Id-
4 See, e.g., United States v. McPartland, Cr. No. 76-52 (D. Or. 1976). In this
case, McPartland purchased the Hock Shop Tavern, a bar and restaurant, with
funds derived from the sale of marijuana. The Internal Revenue Service, in-
vestigating the defendant for tax evasion and using the net worth method of proof,
traced the funds to the narcotics operation. Since the Hock Shop Tavern bought
liquor and food from out-of-state suppliers, the business affected interstate com-
merce. McPartland was indicted under section 1962(a) and for two counts of tax
evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976). The case was disposed of by the defendant's plea
of guilty to the tax evasion counts.
41 The essence of this offense is the legal investment of illegally received
funds. It is impossible to legally invest money in a wholly illegitimate enterprise
since such investment generally constitutes complicity and is a crime in and of
itself. The Justice Department impliedly concurs with this reasoning. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SEC-
TION, STRIKE FORCE 18, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS 4-5
(4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T JUST. MANUAL].
- 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976). Section 1962(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or con-
trol of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, in-
terstate or foreign commerce."
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quisition of an enterprise, the third possibility above. 5 This section, like
section 1962(a), has been consistently limited to the illegal acquisition of
legitimate enterprises."6 Lastly, section 1962(c)' is designed to prevent
the illegal operation of an enterprise, the second and fourth possibilities
above. However, unlike sections 1962(a) and (b), this section has been in-
voked against the operations of a multitude of illegitimate enterprises,
as well as legitimate ones.48 Illegitimate enterprises have also been sub-
ject to scrutiny when RICO's conspiracy provision, section 1962(d),49 has
been applied. Since illegitimate enterprises are excluded by definition
'" See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978). The victims owned Terminal Sanitation, a garbage
collection firm in New York City. Gambino and Conti also owned garbage collec-
tion firms. The defendants "muscled in" on Terminal and forced the owners to
pay tribute of $4,000 per month. Eventually, the defendants became involved in
loansharking activities, extracting payments with threats of violence. The defend-
ants controlled garbage collection stops in the Coop City area of the Bronx. While
unable to secure a carting license, they required Terminal to pick up the garbage
and "kick-back" one-third of all money collected. Terminal was engaged in in-
terstate commerce. The defendants were indicted under section 1962(b), the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), and for extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976). Each
defendant was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
4 Pragmatically speaking, the government is not interested in protecting the
operators of an illegitimate enterprise, such as an illicit gambling house, from
"muscling in" by other mobsters. Therefore, this section has not been applied to
the illegal acquisition of an illegitimate enterprise. In fact, only section 1962(c) ap-
plies in practice to illegitimate enterprises. See DEP'T JUST. MANUAL. supra note
43, at 20.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See note 12 supra.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) (burglary
rings); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748 (5th
Cir. 1978), aff'd en banc, 590 F.2d 1379, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Delph v. United
States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (hybrid criminal enterprises involving combinations of
criminal activity including counterfeiting, drug dealing, gambling, dealing in
stolen goods and murder); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) (drug rings); United States v. Clemones,
577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978) (prostitution); United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Napoli v. United States, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975)
(gambling); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (loan
sharking).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976). See note 13 supra.
o Section 1962(d) is utilized by federal prosecutors in lieu of the general
federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The RICO conspiracy provision
allegedly "provides the tactical latitude which is necessary to meet certain pat-
terns of criminal activity." DEPT JUST. MANUAL, supra note 43, at 27. In other
1979]
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from the scope of section 1962(a)5 ' and in a practical sense from the
scope of 1962(b),"2 only sections 1962(c) and (d) will be considered herein;
their application to illegitimate enterprises is at the very root of the
Sutton controversy.
Before an analysis of the statute's scope can commence it is important
to understand how RICO works. The elements of section 1962(c) can be
outlined as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person13 employed by or
associated with54 any enterprise 5 affecting interstate commerce 56 to con-
duct such enterprise's affairs, directly or indirectly
57 through a pattern58
words, the traditional "chain" and "wheel" conspiracy theories, developed in
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947) and Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946), are supplanted by the new concept of "enterprise
conspiracy." This supplantation has been severely criticized. See Note, Elliott v.
United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime
Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109, 113-14 (1979). The Sutton majority also re-
jected this new concept of "enterprise conspiracy" on vagueness grounds. 605
F.2d at 266.
5' See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
52 See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
"Person" is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1976). "'Person' includes any in-
dividual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id.
5 This element is not defined in the statute, but a group of defendants at-
tempted to use the terms "associated with" to limit the statute's scope and
thereby cause dismissal of their indictments in United States v. Forsythe, 429 F.
Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). The defendants
were a group of Pennsylvania magistrates and constables indicted under section
1962(c) for receiving kickbacks from a bail-bond agency in exchange for referrals
of prisoners brought before their courts. The defendants claimed that "associated
with" was limited to those persons "inside" the bail-bond enterprise rather than
those "outside," like themselves. That is, "associated with" covers only those per-
sons actually employed by the agency although not receiving regular wages, such
as agents, attorneys, etc. Based on this argument the district court dismissed the
indictments. 429 F. Supp. at 725. The Third Circuit reversed, preferring an ex-
pansive reading of the statute. 560 F.2d at 1136.
"Enterprise" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See note 2 supra and
accompanying text.
," RICO was enacted under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3;
hence, every offense charged under RICO requires a showing that the enterprise
have at least a minimal effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (RICO
is a valid exercise of the commerce power).
5' Conducting an enterprise is the essence of the offense. See note 61 infra
and accompanying text.
" "'[Plattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeer-
ing activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter (Oct.
15, 1970) and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
[Vol. 28:629
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of racketeering activity 9 or collection of unlawful debts."0 In essence,
this section "outlaws the use of an enterprise to commit illegal acts.""1
The first and foremost requirement in making out a RICO violation is
the "enterprise." The definition of an enterprise as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en-
tity,""2 is broad enough to be nearly all-inclusive. Next, there must be
some showing that the enterprise affects interstate commerce. 3 Finally,
RICO is designed to be used against organized crime, not isolated
criminal endeavors, hence a pattern of racketeering activity is
required.6 ' These three requirements are essential to proving any RICO
offense, not just those arising under section 1962(c).65
5 Offenses constituting racketeering activity are listed at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1976). The two requisite acts referred to in section 1961(5) can be achieved
through any combination of twenty-four federal crimes or eight state crimes
listed in the section.
The legislative purpose behind listing the acts which comprise racketeer-
ing, rather than defining racketeering through a list of attributes, is to avoid con-
stitutional challenges based on vagueness. As a result, being a member of
"organized crime" is not a statutory prerequisite to the application of RICO.
United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom., Grancich v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050, rehearing denied, 424 U.S. 950
(1976).
" "Unlawful debt" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976).
61 DEP'T JUST. MANUAL, supra note 43, at 20.
2 18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (1976).
See note 56 supra.
See notes 58-59 supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979). The fact pat-
tern in Huber epitomizes -the type of activity RICO was designed to prevent,
although the case is atypical in that it does not involve organized racketeers.
Karl R. Huber was a 1965 graduate of Harvard Law School and a member of the
New Jersey bar. Instead of working for a Newark law firm as planned, Huber
joined his father in acquiring an established hospital and surgical supply business
(HEC). HEC entered into numerous cost-plus contracts with hospitals in New
York and New Jersey for the sale of various goods. The net mark-up in the con-
tracts was fixed between 5-8%. After the Hubers acquired HEC, they directed
their employees to inflate the manufacturers' costs quoted to the hospitals. In-
voices were falsified when necessary, and freight was charged to the hospital
when, in fact, it had not been incurred. As a result of these fraudulent practices,
the actual mark-up to the defendants was between 18-29%. The over charges
totalled about $471,000, mostly subject to reimbursement by the federal govern-
ment. There was evidence that the mail service was used in the scheme to
defraud. Huber was charged with violating RICO section 1962(c), and with counts
alleging general conspiracy, mail fraud, making false statements to a grand jury,
plus other related offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to prison terms
totalling four consecutive years, fines totalling $108,000, forfeiture of HEC, plus
prosecution fees equalling $19,412.72. Note that the three RICO requirements
were established: 1) the legitimate enterprise was HEC; 2) it affected interstate
commerce; and 3) the repeated fraudulent misrepresentations through the mails
constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
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It is evident that the existence of an "enterprise" is the most signifi-
cant element within the statute. Because the statute does not speci-
fically differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, the
definition of "enterprise" has been the vehicle used to extend RICO to
illegitimate organizations. For example, the government's brief in Sut-
ton asserts that the "criminal enterprise" conducted by Sutton, Wein-
traub, and the others constituted a "group of individuals associated in
fact," and therefore the RICO statute was applicable. In support of this
conclusion, the government contends that section 1961(4) refers to three
groups of enterprises: 1) recognized legal entities ("any individual,
partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity");7 2) unions;"
and 3) all other enterprises, including illegitimate ones, ie., "group(s) of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 9 In addition,
the government attaches significance to the word "any" preceding
"enterprise" in sections 1962(a), (b) and (c),"0 and the word "includes" used
to introduce the textual definition of "enterprise."7 It is argued that
Congress' use of the word "any" manifests an intention that RICO apply
to all enterprises, legitimate and illegitimate alike, and that the use of
this broad term is especially significant since Congress could have easily
limited RICO's scope by using the restrictive term "any legitimate
enterprise" if in fact such limitation had been intended. 2 Moreover, the
Congressional use of the word "includes" to introduce the definition of
"enterprise" is said to manifest an intent that the definition be il-
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 7; 605 F.2d at 265.
67 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
There is some support for viewing unions as a special consideration. See S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970). The
government finds additional support from the fact that the "phrase [any union] is
not situated in the list of illustrations before 'other legal' because of the tradi-
tional legal questions that have arisen as to whether unions are separate and
apart from their members and can be sued as an organization or whether the in-
dividuals must be sued." Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 6 (citing North Amer-
cian Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW, 497 F.2d 459, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1974)). This
argument does not explain the inclusion of "association" in the "other legal" sec-
tion, some of which are also not suable per se. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at
6.
, Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 6.
7" Id., at 5; 605 F.2d at 264.
7 "'[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1976) (emphasis added).
" This argument is not new, in fact it was utilized in the earliest cases. See
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied sub nom.,
Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v.
Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). But see United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975).
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lustrative and not exhaustive. As a result, the list of entities (in-
dividuals, partnerships, etc.) is not truly complete and illegitimate en-
tities should also be considered part of the definition.
7
Frequently, this semantic analysis is coupled with another unique
feature of RICO. Title IX, as enacted, contained a section which stated
that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its remedial purposes."75 This liberal construction clause
facilitates the expansive reading of "enterprise" offered by the govern-
ment,"6 and, as a result, it has been repeatedly employed by the pre-
Sutton opinions sympathizing with the government's expansive view.
77
RICO, however, is a criminal statute and as such is subject to strict con-
struction. As the traditional canon states, "fajmbiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.7 8
The dilemma immediately presented is whether the liberal construc-
tion clause can be used to circumvent the traditional canon requiring
strict construction of a criminal statute. In the context of liberally con-
struing the meaning of "enterprise" to reach illegitimate organizations,
it seems clear that the liberal construction clause cannot have this ef-
fect. Certainly, the Sutton majority would agree,7 as would the other
courts refusing to employ the liberal construction clause.0 It should be
7" The government has previously indicated that Congress makes use of the
verb "means" when it intends an exhaustive definition, as in the case of "rac-
keteering activity" in section 1961(1). See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp.
134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized
this differentiation in the Congressional use of the terms "includes" and "means."
See Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1941)
(interpreting § 26 of the Federal Farm Loan Act to determine if petitioner was
exempt from paying $8.02 in state sales tax); Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293
U.S. 121, 125 n.1, (1934) (interpreting the phrase "taxable year" defined at § 200(a)
of the Revenue Act of 1926).
", See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979); United States
v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
" Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970).
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 9.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swiderski,
593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 933 (1975); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Delph v.
United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083,
1092 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106; United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp.
1091, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
78 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
605 F.2d at 269.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1071 (3d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 853 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp, 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976); United
States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975).
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noted that RICO contains numerous civil remedies patterned after an-
titrust law."l These remedies were specifically developed to attack
organized crime's pocketbook, an area previously unscathed.12 It is
toward these civil remedies that the liberal construction clause is
directed, not toward the criminal provisions of the statute such as sec-
tion 1961(4), which are still subject to strict construction.8 Therefore,
the employment of the liberal construction clause to expand RICO to il-
legitimate enterprises is misplaced.
The Sutton majority also asserts that the government misread sec-
tion 1961(4), the definition of "enterprise." The majority rejects the
government's tripartite grouping" and instead dichotomizes the defini-
tion. 5 The first part of the dichotomy, recognized legal entities (in-
dividuals, partnerships, corporations), parallels the government's
reading. However, the second part, "entities without formally re-
cognized legal personalities," lumps unions with "group(s) of individuals
associated in fact."" The implication drawn from this dichotomy is that
while each part refers to a legitimate enterprise, the difference between
groups is in formal legal recognition, not the enterprise's legitimate or
illegitimate function. 7 It follows, and the majority forthrightly asserts
81 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). The civil remedies allow for divestiture, injunction,
and dissolution. The obvious advantage to the government in seeking these
remedies lies in the fact that a lesser standard of proof (preponderance of the
evidence) suffices. Section 1964(c) also allows citizen suits to recover treble
damages. In addition, section 1965 relaxes traditional venue requirements. Id. §
1965. See Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp. 452 F. Supp. 1278
(D. Del. 1978). The remaining sections, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1966-1968 (1976), involve
speedy trials, trials closed to the public, and extensive liberalizations of
discovery procedures. It is clear that these measures are remedial in nature and
therefore particularly subject to the liberal construction clause.
See generally Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate
Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975).
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its traditional stance favoring lenity
where the ambit of a criminal statute is concerned in Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100 (1979). Interestingly, Dunn involved Title IV of the Organized Crime
Control Act, which covers making false declarations to a grand jury. Justice Mar-
shall stated for the majority that "[tjhis practice (of favoring lenity) reflects not
merely a convenient maxim of statutory construction. Rather, it is rooted in fun-
damental principles of due process, which mandate that no individual be forced to
speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited." Id., at 105.
Thus, in Sutton, the canon favoring lenity appears to mean that RICO should not
be extended to illegitimate enterprises unless specifically stated.
See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
605 F.2d at 265.
SId.
7 From a grammatical standpoint, this interpretation seems reasonable. The
definition combines two clauses joined by a coordinating conjunction-"and"-
with a coma inserted before the conjunction for clarity. In addition, the majority
interpretation conforms to the dictates of the doctrine of ejusdem generis which
requires that where general words, such as "individuals associated in fact,"
[Vol. 28:629
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss4/7
UNITED STA TES v. SUTTON
that section 1961(4) does not indicate "what attributes or activities these
units must assume or undertake before they are deemed an 'enterprise'
in any meaningful sense. . . . Individuals and groups do not become
'enterprises' except in relation to something they do."" In Sutton, the
"something done" by the enterprise was racketeering. According to the
majority, acceptance of the government's view results in the creation of
an "enterprise" any time a "pattern of racketeering activity" is
established.8 The extreme example the majority provides is an in-
dividual who robs two banks9" for the purpose of making money.8 The
logical result of the government's theory is to make RICO a mere pro-
hibition on racketeering activity so that any reference to "enterprises"
is excess verbiage.
This entire statutory analysis makes one thing clear: RICO's fatal am-
biguity is that its scope is never clarified. It is not known whether il-
legitimate enterprises are included or excluded. The expansive view ac-
cepted in five circuits is appealing because it maximizes the statute's ap-
plication to criminal endeavors, like those in Sutton. The restrictive
view, articulated by the Sutton majority, offers crisp reasoning and con-
trol on a statute pregnant with the potential for abuse.2 Each view has
merit, but neither can be said to be conclusive. As a result, the next
step in the analysis of RICO's scope is to examine the legislative history
to determine the intent of Congress, the body that originally created
the problem.
C. Legislative History
The Sutton majority prefaces its discussion of RICO's legislative
history with the statement that the history "is remarkable for the clarity
with which it speaks to the issue of the intended scope of the 'enter-
prise' element of the crime."" Others arguing Sutton's restrictive view
have also made this statement." Those arguing the expansive view,
follow words of a particular meaning, such as "union," the general words are con-
strued in light of the specific and not given the widest possible meaning. As a
result, "union," which is a legitimate organization, characterizes the attributes of
"individuals associated in fact," hence "individuals associated in fact" must also,
necessarily, be legitimate organizations. See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at
107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); But see United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d
1083, 1091 (3d Cir. 1977).
" 605 F.2d at 265.
89Id.
" IL at 266.
" The enterprise is bank robbing; as members of the Federal Reserve, banks
engage in interstate commerce, and the two robberies constitute a pattern under
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
See notes 161-220 infra and accompanying text.
" 605 F.2d at 266-67.
" See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 108 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissent-
ing); Note, supra note 50, at 116.
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however, have generally sought to avoid RICO's history because it is
mostly unfavorable to their cause."5 In any event, the fact remains that
the term "enterprise" is never discussed in the legislative history, other
than its actual inclusion in the text of the statute. As a result, the
legislative history can never conclusively settle the debate of whether
RICO was intended to include illegitimate enterprises as well as those
that are legitimate.
RICO's history still provides general clues as to its intended scope,
most supporting Sutton's restrictive holding. Even a cursory review of
the relevant legislative documents will bear this out. From its date of in-
troduction,"9 through the Senate hearings,97 the Senate report,9" the
House hearings,99 and the House report,10 the over-riding theme was
"' The Seventh Circuit in an early opinion attempted to use RICO's legislative
history to justify its application to illegitimate enterprises with disastrous
results. Citing the Senate Report on the Organized Crime Control Act, S. REP.
NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1969), the court stated that RICO was
especially designed to prohibit illegal gambling businesses, the implication being
that RICO covered illegitimate enterprises. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The problem was that
the court cited the portion of the Senate report dealing with Title VIII, directed
toward syndicated gambling, not RICO (Title IX). This error was discovered by a
New York district court in United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 129
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) and by a student commentator. Note, supra note 82, at 202. The
Seventh Circuit recognized its error in United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836,
853-54 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978), but nevertheless reaffirmed
its holding that RICO applied to illegitimate enterprises. United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
" While introducing S. 1861, the bill which later became Title IX of S. 30
(RICO), Senator McClellan stated: "To aid in the pressing need to remove
organized crime from legitimate organizations in our country, I have thus for-
mulated this bill .... This bill is designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate
business repeatedly outlined by investigators of various congressional commit-
tees and (the) President's Crime Commission." 115 CONG. REC. 9568 (1969). For
the history of S. 1861, see note 36 supra.
Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. The concern of the com-
mittee with Syndicate infiltration of legitimate business was manifested by the
fact that they called the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's Advisory Panel
on Crime Prevention, Donald F. Taylor, who summarized the problem and en-
dorsed S. 1861 as a remedy. Id., at 413-21 (1969) (remarks of Donald F. Taylor).
98 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRIME CON-
TROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT].
Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of
Organized Crime Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
Although opposition to some portions of S. 30, including RICO, became evi-
dent in the House hearings, everyone who testified spoke only to RICO's applica-
tion to criminal infiltration of legitimate business. Again, the emphasis was on
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RICO's employment in removing organized crime from legitimate
business. During the floor debates in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, the consensus among proponents and dissenters alike
was that RICO was primarily intended "to root out the influence of
organized crime in legitimate business into which billions of dollars of il-
legally obtained money is channelled and which is often used, along with
violence, to drive out legitimate competitors." 10' It is significant that
even the Justice Department seemed to recognize this limited scope of
the statute."2
There are two exceptions to this overwhelming emphasis on
racketeer infiltration of legitimate business, both are cited by the
government to support its expansive reading.' 3 The first instance occur-
red in an exchange between Senators Hruska, McClellan, and Magnuson
the infiltration and remedial aspects of the statute, as indicated by various com-
ments of its proponents, id., at 106 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 548
(remarks of American Bar Assoc. president-elect, Edward L. Wright); and of its
opponents, id. at 291 (remarks of Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman of N.Y.C. Bar
Association Comm. on Fed. Legis.); id. at 499 (remarks of Lawrence Speiser,
director of Washington office, ACLU).
100 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1970, H. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
The House Report repeated the same comments relating to "enterprise," id. at
56, at 4032, and section 1962(c), id. at 57, at 4033, as the SENATE REPORT, supra
note 98. But in addition, the House Report includes the dissenting views of
Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan. HOUSE REPORT, supra this note, at
181, at 4076. Significantly, all speak to infiltration of legitimate business.
01 116 CONG. REC. 603 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough). In opening the
floor debates, Senator McClellan set the tone in his statement that "Title IX is
aimed at removing organized crime from legitimate organizations." Id. at 591
(remarks of Sen. McClellan). This same theme continued throughout the debates.
See id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska), id. at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at
802 (remarks of Sen. Scott); id. at 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
In the House, although dissent was more prevalent, the only theme was, again,
infiltration of legitimate business. See id. at 35295 (remarks of Rep. Poff), id at
35208 (remarks of Rep. Ryan), id. at 35304 (remarks of Rep. Railsback). At one
point, Representative Poff made the sweeping statement that "an attack must be
made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on
all available fronts." Id. at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff). The government cites
this statement to buttress an expansive reading of "any enterprise." Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 37, at 12. Throughout his address, however, Representative
Poff referred to the inadequacy of the traditional remedies in controlling the in-
filtration of legitimate business. His sweeping statement was made in connection
with his support for RICO's criminal forfeiture remedy, and not with the scope of
RICO's application.
"o See, Senate Hearings, supra note 97, at 387 (1969); Report of Attorney
General Richard G. Kleindienst to Subcommittee chairman John L. McClellan,
reprinted in id., at 404; House Hearings, supra note 99, at 170.
"0 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 11-12.
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during the Senate debates on Title IX (RICO).'0' Senator Magnuson ex-
pressed concern over the Judiciary Committee's possible encroachment
on the Commerce Committee's authority by formulating RICO. During
the exchange, the scope of Title IX was discussed:
Mr. McClellan: ... One purpose of Title IX is directed to funds
which are received from illicit activities, funds that ought play
no role in interstate commerce. For example, if it is organized
gambling. -
Mr. Magnuson: If it is illegal gambling.
Mr. McClellan: Yes; if it is illegal gambling, engaged in by syn-
dicates of shylocking or whatever, and those funds are used for
investment in legitimate business in interstate commerce that
would constitute a crime under Title IX. That kind of activity is
what we are trying to prevent.
Mr. Magnuson: I think that clears up the matter. Also, I sup-
pose the proceeds from illegal activities in one State that are
transported to another State, to be used in further illegal ac-
tivities would be included?
Mr. Hruska: They might be involved in Title IX. .... 105
Obviously, an illegal gambling operation would constitute an "illegiti-
mate enterprise." The other instance occurred in a speech by Senator
McClellan after the Organized Crime Control Act (S. 30) had cleared the
Senate, but had run into opposition in the House. The New York City
Bar Association Committee on Federal Legislation viewed section
1961(1), defining "racketeering activity" through a list of federal of-
fenses, as too inclusive, thereby leading to the misapplication of RICO
against persons not engaged in organized crime. One of the objec-
tionable federal offenses listed was the unlawful use of a stolen credit
card. 106 Senator McClellan answered this criticism by stating, "[cfredit
card offenses illustrate my point extremely well, because while they are
commonly committed by persons having no organized crime connec-
tions, organized crime has made big business out of dealing in stolen and
counterfeit credit cards, sometimes selling $250 kits, each with a credit
card and proof of identity.""' 7 As the government points out, there is
nothing "ostensibly lawful" in selling stolen credit cards with phoney
proof of identity."8 Neither of these instances expressly advocates
RICO's application to illegitimate enterprises and both should be read in
light of the abundant evidence to the contrary.
Other than these two plain exceptions, the government's argument
10, 116 CONG. REC. 844 (1970).
Id. (emphasis added).
"' See House Hearings, supra note 99, at 329.
'0 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970), reprinted in, McClellan, supra note 26, at 143.
1" Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 11.
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that the legislative history supports the expansive view follows the
same pattern as its analysis of the statutory language; most of the em-
phasis is placed on isolated terms and inferences therefrom."9 For exam-
ple, the government finds support for the expansive view in the
statute's title, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations." They
asserted that Congress meant for "Racketeer Influenced" to refer to
organized crime's involvement with legitimate business while "Corrupt
Organizations" refers to "organizations or enterprises that are in-
herently corrupt." ''1 Not only is this argument superficial, Congress
never made this distinction."'
The government also places reliance on the statute's statement of
purpose."' "Congress was very explicit when it stated that 'it is the pur-
pose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by
establishing new penal prohibitions and by providing enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime. """ Further, it is asserted that the Congres-
sional findings make it clear that Congress was not solely concerned
with organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business."" In its fourth
finding, Congress stated that all of "organized crime('s) activities, not
just the corruption of legitimate businesses, were weakening the stabil-
ity of the nation's economic system and causing other problems.""' 5 The
logical inference drawn from these statements is that Congress in-
tended a wide ranging attack on all aspects of organized crime's ac-
tivities, and therefore to limit RICO to legitimate enterprises con-
travenes this intent.
This argument seems convincing and has been accepted by some
courts."" However, in its second and third findings, Congress also
stated:
See notes 66-74 supra and accompanying text.
"' Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 4.
"' Both terms, "Racketeer Influenced" and "Corrupt Organizations" referred
to the same piece of legislation, S. 1861. See 115 CONG. REC. 9566, 9568 (1969). S.
1861 was entitled the Corrupt Organizations Act. Upon enactment, however, it
was to become Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code and be labeled
"Racketeer Influenced Organizations." When S. 1861 was incorporated into S. 30,
the label became "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" (RICO). The
title changes were insignificant and not due to any intervening substantive
changes.
"' Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922
(1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073.
'is Id.
114 Id.
"' Petitioner's Brief, supra note 37, at 3.
11 See United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106.
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(2) Organized Crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syn-
dicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of stolen
property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt
our democratic processes."7
Since the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose applies to
all eleven titles of the Organized Crime Control Act, not just Title IX," 8
it is reasonable to assume that the third finding is the only finding
directly applicable to Title IX (RICO). Therefore, it appears the provi-
sions cited by the government actually refer to other titles."9
Not all of the government's assertions regarding RICO's history are
so easily rebutted. As noted previously, RICO was the product of two
bills separately introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan.2" The
first bill, S. 1623- the Criminal Activities Profits Act - was introduced
on March 20, 1969 and was designed to prohibit the investment of
money that either was received from specified criminal activities or was
intentionally unreported for federal income tax purposes. 2' The bill's
stated objectives made it clear that it was aimed at halting racketeer in-
filtration of legitimate business.'" Its substantive provisions prohibited
investment in "any business enterprise."'2" This term was undefined but
17 Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 112 (emphasis added).
18 United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert,
J., dissenting).
"I Perhaps, this entire emphasis on the broad Congressional Statement of
Findings and Purpose is misplaced. The Organized Crime Control Act as original-
ly proposed (S. 30), contained virtually the same Statement of Findings and Pur-
pose as above. Reference was still made to the threat of infiltration of legitimate
business (findings 2 and 3), yet S. 30 did not contain a provision to fight this
threat. In fact, nothing was available to stop the infiltration of business until S.
1623 and, later, S. 1861 were proposed and amended to S. 30 as Title IX. See note
36 supra. It should be noted that the statute finally enacted, S. 30 as proposed,
and S. 1861 all had virtually the same Statement of Findings and Purpose. See
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970);
S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 829 (1969); S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969).
" See note 36 supra.
121 S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)-(c), 115 CONG. REC. 6995-96 (1969).
" While introducing S. 1623, Senator Hruska stated: "This bill is aimed
specifically at racketeer infiltration of legitimate business and it is premised prin-
cipally upon our existing antitrust laws." 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969).
'1 Section 2(a) of S. 1623 states:
Whoever, being a person who has received any income derived directly
or indirectly from any criminal activity in which such person par-
ticipated as a principle .... applies any part of such income or the pro-
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it is fair to assume "business" is synonymous with "legitimate" when
viewed in context with other provisions of S. 1623."4 This approach,
which is significantly more limited than RICO's "any enterprise" ap-
proach, was categorically rejected at the Senate hearings by the Depart-
ment of Justice as being too narrow.'
Prior to the Justice Department's condemnation of S. 1623, and
possibly in anticipation of the Department's objections, Senators Mc-
Clellan and Hruska introduced S. 1861.2' This bill, which eventually
became RICO, opted for the broader language of "any enterprise," and
in addition corrected other deficiencies of S. 1623. S. 1861 was endorsed
by the Justice Department 2 ' and subsequently incorporated into S. 30,
the Organized Crime Control Act.12 The obvious argument to be made is
that Congress chose this expansive language in order to give RICO a
broader application, including illegitimate enterprises.
Even more supportive of the expansive view are Congressional actions
subsequent to RICO's enactment in 1970. First, Congress has neither
discussed nor attempted to amend RICO, . indicating implied ac-
quiescence in the broad interpretation given "enterprise" by the five
circuits considering the question prior to Sutton.'2" Second, and more im-
portantly, the Senate Judiciary Committee has twice expressly ac-
ceeds of any such income to the acquisition by or on behalf of such per-
son of legal title to or beneficial interest in any of the assets, liabilities,
or capital of any business enterprise which is engaged in, or the ac-
tivities which affect, interstate or foreign commerce shall be guilty of a
felony....
S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969).
It is apparent that this section parallels section 1962(a) of RICO, see note 41
supra. Section 2(b) of S. 1623 applied to officers of the infiltrated business, mak-
ing them guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 2(c) applied to tax fraud.
"' Section 2(a) refers to "legal title," "beneficial interest," "assets," "capital,"
etc., all attributes of legitimate businesses. In addition, much attention was paid
to the bill's remedies of injunction and citizens' suits, not generally applicable to
criminal enterprises. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 115 CONG. REC. 6995
(1969).
12 First, it is too narrow in that it merely prohibits the investment of
prohibited funds in a business, but fails to prohibit the control or opera-
tion of such a business by means of prohibited racketeering activities.
Second, it fails to provide for forfeiture of any interest in a business ac-
quired in violation of its prohibition. Third, it fails to include any specific
provision of divesture or dissolution, and, fourth, it does not provide for
the panoply of civil investigative devices....
Prepared Statement of Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Senate Hearings, supra note 97, at 388.
1 See note 36 supra.
1 See Report of Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Subcommittee
chairman John L. McClellan, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 97, at -04.
12 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
1 See note 5 supra.
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cepted the view that RICO applied to illegitimate enterprises. The first
instance occurred during. Senate consideration of the Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1977.130 The second and more significant instance occur-
red during consideration of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979.111 In
this case, the Senate committee report noted that:
The term "enterprise" as used in 18 U.S.C. 1962 has been con-
strued broadly to include a combination of individuals associated
with various corporations ... as well as businesses both foreign
and domestic and illegal as well as legal .... The only appellate
court decision to the contrary is United States v. Sutton . . .
petition for rehearing pending. The Committee endorses the ma-
jority view .... The Comittee intends that the same broad inter-
pretations be given the term "enterprise" in this bill."3 2
Although committee reports are not the law, these two references are
significant in that they lend credence to the belief that RICO's applica-
tion to illegitimate enterprises was so obvious that it was not even
discussed by Congress."
In final analysis, RICO's legislative history seems as ambiguous as the
statute in defining the extent of its scope. This is particularly true when
recent congressional developments are considered. As a result, the
courts have been free to manipulate, expand, or restrict the statute as
the need arises.
0 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE
REFORM ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 777 n.31 (1977).
The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 was introduced by Senators McClellan
and Kennedy and was basically a recodification of Title 18 of the United States
Code. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S6833 (daily ed. May 2,
1977). Section 1802 of S. 1437 is a recodification of RICO. Id. at 6838. The bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 72-15. 124 CONG. REC. S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
1978). However, after extensive hearings in the House, the bill died in committee.
"[I]t is neither essential nor desirable to enact S. 1437 (or a bill similar to it)."
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE RECODIFICATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW, H. REP. No. 29, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35 (1978).
131 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE REFORM
ACT OF 1979, S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 803 (1980).
132 Id. n.32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The movement to recodify
federal criminal law was resurrected by Senator Kennedy when he introduced S.
1722 on September 7, 1979. Proposed hearings began on September 11, 1979. A
companion bill, H. 6233, was introduced in the House on January 7, 1980.
133 According to G. Robert Blakey (chief counsel of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate during 1969 and 1970), the
principal draftsman and architect of Title IX, a "group of individuals
associated in fact" as used in the definition section of "enterprise" was
always envisioned to include illegal associations. This inclusion was so
obvious on the face of the statute that it was not pointed out in the
legislative history.
Petitioner's Brief, note 37 supra, at 14-15 (emphasis in original).
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D. Case Law
The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with RICO other than
in dictum where the Court stated that the statute "seeks to prevent the
infiltration of legitimate business operations affecting interstate com-
merce by individuals who have obtained investment capital from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.""'3 The obvious reference was to RICO sec-
tion 1962(a) which specifically prevents the investment of illegally
received funds.135 Although this statement probably was not meant to be
the final word on the scope of RICO, it has been offered to support the
restrictive view.
138
Interestingly, of the circuits that have considered the question of
RICO's application to illegitimate enterprises, all but the Ninth Circuit
have had at least one case appealed. Certiorari has been denied in every
instance."3 7
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts
have fashioned their own interpretations of RICO. Those upholding the
statute's extension to illegitimate enterprises have generally utilized a
combination of arguments already discussed.' 38 Only one early district
court opinion has concurred with the Sutton majority's result and ra-
tionale.' 9 At the opposite end, another district court has held that RICO
' Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 787 n.19 (1975) (dictum) (emphasis
added) (holding a conviction under separate counts of syndicating gambling (18
U.S.C. § 1955) and conspiracy to violate gambling laws (18 U.S.C. § 371) did not
violate Wharton's Rule).
'8 See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
' See 605 F.2d at 263.
137 See cases cited in note 5 supra. In one case involving RICO, certiorari was
dismissed. United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). In another case the
Supreme Court vacated an affirmance of a RICO conviction and required review
of the concurrent sentence doctrine. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th
Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1979).
"' See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
189 United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975), overruled by
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Napoli
v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). In Moeller, the defendant was majority
stockholder in a corporation that owned a subsidiary, the Sponge Rubber Pro-
ducts Co. The defendant was accused of setting fire to a sponge rubber plant in
order to collect on an insurance policy with a face value of $51,578,000. The indict-
ment charged the defendant and others with "constituting and being associated
with an enterprise engaged in, and the activities of which affected interstate
commerce . . . to wit: a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of
burning and destroying buildings.... 402 F. Supp. at 57. The trial court held that
RICO only applied to legitimate enterprises and since burning buildings is not
legitimate, the court dismissed the RICO count.
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applies only to organized crime, and not legitimate business. " ° An area
where RICO has been successfully employed repeatedly is in the pro-
secution of corrupt public officials engaging in influence peddling
schemes."' The office overseen by the official is generally considered
the "enterprise.""2 Foreign corporations. and union officials'" have
also been targets.
RICO's constitutionality has been attacked on several grounds:
vagueness,"5 violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws,"'
U4 Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Dr. Barr was a
customer of WUI/TAS, a telephone answering service operating in 50 states with
yearly revenues equalling $17,000,000. Barr alleged that WUI/TAS fixed prices
and charged for messages not received in violation of RICO. Filing an amended
complaint under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, Barr sought treble damages, costs, and legal
fees. The trial court held that RICO was not designed for this type of case, but
only applied to organized crime due to references to the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra,
racketeers, and the like in the legislative history. Even assuming the plaintiff's
allegations were true and the defendant's acts were illegal, the court reasoned
that to allow filing under RICO would prejudice the defendant by inferring a con-
nection with organized crime. Id. at 113.
"4 Courts within the Third Circuit have had the most experience with RICO's
use against corrupt public officials. See United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065 (3d
Cir. 1978) (bribes accepted by a prison warden); United States v. Vignola, 464 F.
Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (kick-backs to a traffic court judge); United States v.
Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 947 (1978) (Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives
"sold" admissions to the state's professional schools); United States v. Forsythe,
429 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (kick-backs to
judges and constables operating a bail bond referral service); United States v.
Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affl'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied sub nom., Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (bribes ac-
cepted by Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Tax officials). For
cases involving members of local police departments, see United States v.
Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
"u But see United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
', United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
'" United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded,
439 U.S. 810 (1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 591 F.2d 278 (1979);United States
v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1978); United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
'" See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Grancich v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd,
527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
'" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Grancich v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 578
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violation of the double jeopardy clause, "7 denial of equal protection,"'
and subjection of defendants to cruel and unusual punishment. "9 Each
time, however, the statute has been upheld.
To summarize, RICO's intended scope has never been spelled out,
neither in the statute nor during the legislative process. As a result, the
courts have been free to improvise. Their fear of creating a technical
loophole in the statute's scope, such as allowing criminals to plead that
their "enterprise" is wholly illegal, and thereby not covered by RICO,
has forced most courts to accept the expansive view. However, their
reliance on somewhat superficial arguments to rationalize this expan-
sion, such as the statute's broad statement of purpose' and the isolated
term "any enterprise,"'' has left an unsettling feeling, especially in light
of the comprehensive and logically appealing "black letter law" analysis
offered by the Sutton majority.
The net effect of the expansive approach is that it allows increasing
accumulation of prosecutorial discretion by not strictly delineating the
parameters of the statute. As a result, there is a very real threat that
this increased discretion will lead to abuse, e.g. applying RICO to a ban-
dit who robs two banks. 5 ' The balancing of the need to keep the statute
free of loopholes and therefore viable as a weapon against organized
crime, against the increased potential for abuse, is a problem which has
and will continue to plague the courts if they continue on their expan-
sionist path, especially if they do not define the statute's boundaries.
III. ABUSE OF RICO
A. The Problem
Thus far, the emphasis of this note has been on the two judicial views
of RICO's scope and the reasoning supporting each position. The
ramifications of the Sutton court's restrictive holding, however, clearly
go beyond the reversal of ten racketeering convictions. It manifests the
apprehension among some members of the judiciary that RICO's poten-
tial for abuse is so great that they are willing to limit the statute almost
to the point of rendering it nugatory. The question is whether this ap-
prehension is justified.
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Mandel,
415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
1"7 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nori., Millhouse v. United States, 424 U.S. 1072
(1978); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd 527 F.2d
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
" See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
1'9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, 609 F.2d at 306.
" See notes 112-119 supra and accompanying text.
's' See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
'" See 605 F.2d at 266; note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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Since the enactment of RICO, there has been fear among some that
the statute's "grant of virtually unlimited investigative powers to the
government creates a serious danger that the government's under-
standable zeal in the pursuit of organized crime may result in a per-
vasive undermining of important civil liberties, an erosion that would in-
ure to the detriment of us all."' 3
Although this statement may seem exceedingly pessimistic, it stems
from some obvious technical difficulties within the statute. For instance,
RICO is not limited to members of organized crime, i.e., the "Mafia."
"[Tlhe title makes no discrete segregation of mobsters. It is a tool to be
employed for all.""15 The obvious reason for eschewing this limitation is
that Congress was trying to avoid the problems associated with status
crimes.'55 Another reason is that no one can agree on a suitable defini-
tion of "Organized Crime,"'56 therefore, the "crime" is defined in terms
of composite underlying crimes and attributes associated with or-
ganized criminal activity. 5 ' Although these attributes are characteristic
of "mobsters," they are not limited to them."' When it was suggested
that being a member of "organized crime" be made an element of the of-
fense, the suggestion was soundly rejected.' 51 From the beginning, then,
it was understood that RICO would apply to everyone.
'3 116 CONG REC. 855 (1970) (remarks of the ACLU introduced by Sen. Young).
'" Dissenting views of Rep. Conyers, Mikva and Ryan, HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 100, at 187.
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971).
Dissenting views of Rep. Conyers Mikva and Ryan, HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 100, at 196. Concluding their criticism of the Organized Crime Control Act
the dissenters stated:
[E]ven in its draftsmanship it would rather equivocate than fight. Thus
one searches in vain for a definition of "organized crime." In a criminal
statute where the term "organized crime" is an operative device, it is
not defined. When asked about the omission, the drafters explained that
it was impossible to define, but everybody knew what it was.
Id,
157 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5) (1976), discussed at notes 58-59 supra; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 98, at 34.
'" United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom., Grancich v. United States, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
159 116 CONG. REC. 35342 (1970). Representative Biaggi proposed an amend-
ment to Title IX, now section 1962, that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
be a member of a Mafia or La Cosa Nostra organization." "Mafia" and "La Cosa
Nostra" were defined to "pean nationally organized criminal groups composed of
persons of Italian ancestry forming an underworld government ruled by a form of
board of directors, who direct or conduct a pattern of racketeering and control
the national operation of a criminal enterprise in furtherance of a monopolistic
trade restraining criminal conspiracy." Violation of the proposed amendment
would have resulted in a $5,000 fine and/or five years in prison. The amendment
was defeated by voice vote. 116 CONG. REC. 35346 (1970). The Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1979 also has a provision directed against operating a racketeering
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Some questioned if RICO would be effective against its target, the
"Mafia."'" Section 1961(5) requires at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity to establish a pattern."'1 The traditional problem in prosecuting
organized crime, however, is the inability to secure even one
conviction."2 If the government could prove the underlying act as pro-
scribed by section 1961(1), there would be little need for the statute.
63
Both courts and commentators have recognized that RICO's broad ap-
plication to illegitimate enterprises can potentially circumvent other
provisions in the Organized Crime Control Act.'" The most notable ex-
ample is Title VIII which deals with syndicated gambling. 5 Title VIII
requires a minimum involvement of five people'" in a gambling opera-
tion which either exists for a period in excess of thirty days or has a
gross revenue of $2,000 in a single day. 67 Violation of this section sub-
jects one to a fine not greater than $20,000 and/or a maximum five years
in prison.66 RICO, on the other hand, does not require a minimum
syndicate: "A person is guilty of an offense if he organizes, owns, controls,
manages, directs, finances, or otherwise participates in a supervisory capacity in
a racketeering syndicate." S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1801(a) (1979).
'" See note 156 supra; N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Fed. Legislation, House
Hearings, supra note 99, at 327.
161 As originally proposed in S. 1861, "pattern of racketeering activity" was
defined as "at least one act occurring after the effective date of this chapter." S.
1861, § 196116), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969). The Justice
Department noted that "[tihe term 'pattern' indicates what is intended to be pro-
scribed is not a single, isolated act of 'racketeering activity,' but at least two such
acts." Kleindienst Report, supra note 127, at 405. S. 1861 was subsequently
amended to require two acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976), reprinted at note 58
supra.
162 Dissenting views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva and Ryan, HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 100, at 186; N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. on Fed. Legislation, House
Hearings, supra note 99, at 329.
It should be pointed out that both acts of racketeering must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction under RICO. See generally, In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969). In addition, the "acts must have been connected with
each other by some common scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern
and not simply a series of disconnected acts." United States v. Stofsky, 409 F.
Supp. at 614. This connection must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921
(1977).
" Dissenting views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan, HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 100 at 186.
"' See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 109 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also
Atkinson, supra note 24, at 6; Note, supra note 50, at 120.
" Title VIII was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976).
IS 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(ii) (1976).
167 Id. § 1955(b)(1)(iii).
'" Id. § 1955(a).
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number of persons, nor is there a limitation placed on revenues or dura-
tion. All that is required are two acts of gambling indictable under ap-
plicable state law and punishable for at least one year,"6 9 along with
some affect on interstate commerce.' Under this view, it is quite feasi-
ble that "the 'Mom and Pop' variety of illegal gambling business" 7'
would be within RICO's scope. In addition, a conviction under RICO ex-
poses a defendant to more severe penalties, a fine of not more than
$25,000 and/or a maximum twenty years in prison.1 2 This increased
severity of potential penalties is also a concern for those involved in a
RICO cc-ispiracy"'
As the use of RICO has increased,' courts seem to have become more
aware of its potential for abuse. Although the Sutton court was the first
circuit court to severly restrain the statute's application, other judges,
through dissenting opinions, have expressed dissatisfaction in the ex-
pansive interpretation that prevailed in their circuits. 5 In fact, prior to
1I9 Id. § 1961(1)(A).
... Id. § 1962(c), reprinted at note 12 supra. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, convic-
tions do not require proof of effect on interstate commerce. It is presumed that
those operations within the statutory requirements sufficiently affect commerce.
See United States v. Manson, 494 F.2d 804 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
994 (1975); Schneider v. United States, 459 F.2d 540 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 877 (1972).
' N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Fed. Legislation, House Hearings, supra note
99 at 329.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976).
173 As noted, conspiracy under RICO is governed by section 1962(d), not the
general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. See note 50 supra. The disparity of
penalties becomes immediately evident. RICO section 1962(d) carries the same
penalties as the other RICO provisions-$25,000 and/or twenty years imprison-
ment. Section 371, however, only imposes a maximum $10,000 fine and/or five
years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1976). In addition, for example, the Sutton
defendants could have been charged with operating a "continuing criminal enter-
prise" relating to their drug dealings. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). Had this been
done, the same severe penalties could have been imposed without reliance on
RICO. See id. § 848(a)(1).
'I One defendant has characterized the increased use of RICO as "faddish."
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
951 (1978).
175 Judge Van Graafeiland was the first judge in a reported opinion to object to
RICO's use against illegitimate enterprises. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at
107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). In 1979, there were dissents in every
reported circuit opinion involving the scope of "enterprise" with the exception of
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), where a strong warning was
given, see note 176 infra and accompanying text. For dissents see United States
v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 311 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (citing Sut-
ton); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 566 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert,
J., dissenting); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J.,
dissenting).
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Sutton the Second Circuit had sternly warned that, "we caution against
undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO. We also emphasize to
district judges that when RICO is invoked each set of facts must be
evaluated independently. We cannot at this point lay down any fixed
rules concerning the applicability of the statute.""1 ' One can only
speculate whether rules will be forthcoming.
Since Sutton, the Seventh Circuit has again considered RICO's ap-
plication to "illegitimate enterprises." In United States v. Aleman,1" the
court affirmed its prior holding 7 ' that RICO extends to illegal enter-
prises. However, in a biting dissent, Judge Swygert stated, "to main-
tain, as the majority does, that the pattern of criminal activity engaged
in by Aleman and his associates [robbing homes] is an 'enterprise' within
the meaning of the statute is to turn logic on its head."'79 This recogni-
tion and apparent dissatisfaction with the all-inclusive scope of RICO
seems to explain at least one factor motivating the Sutton majority to
adopt its narrow interpretation.
Another justifiable concern of the Sutton majority is RICO's incursion
into state criminal law enforcement.8 ' The two predicate acts which con-
stitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" can be accomplished through
committing any one of eight state felonies twice,"8 ' thus, a state offense
which would typically be prosecuted by state authorities now becomes a
federal offense. For example, two robberies of a convenience food store
by two individuals would subject them to RICO's penalties under the
government's expansive view since the "enterprise" would consist of, to
paraphrase the statute, "a group of two individuals associated in fact for
the purpose of robbing convenience food stores," assuming an affect on
interstate commerce.
Although the fact pattern in Sutton reveals a much more serious and
sophisticated enterprise than robbing convenience food stores, and it
would be easier to justify the majority's restrictive holding had the
178 United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979).
177 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
's United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975).
179 609 F.2d at 311 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
'8 605 F.2d at 270. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn.
1975); Atkinson, supra note 24, at 6; 116 CONG. REC. 35205 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Mikva) ("What we have done in one fell swoop-and the States-righters who may
be in this room should listen-is to incorporate as a part of the Federal law all of
the offenses which heretofore have traditionally been treated as under State and
local jurisdictions.").
sl 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1976) provides: "'Racketeering activity' means (A)
any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year ....
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statute been applied to a flagrantly abusive situation, the fact remains
that the Sutton majority was aware of RICO's potential for abuse.
B. Specific Examples
Although it should not be concluded that abuse of RICO is the rule
rather than the exception, isolated instances of abuse have arisen in the
reported cases."2
In United States v. Morris,' the defendant and two accomplices plan-
ned and participated in a series of rigged card games in hotel suites
located in Las Vegas and Lake Tahoe, Nevada. Over a period of nine-
teen months the three recruited unsuspecting card players, "marks" in
the jargon of the trade,-invited them to the suite for a friendly game of
cards, and then defrauded the victims through sleight-of-hand tricks
which guaranteed the winning hand to one of the three confederates.184
The winnings were then split three ways. The evidence indicated Morris
made regular trips from his home in Texas to Nevada where the games
took place. He was indicted for conducting an "enterprise" described as
"a group of individuals associated in fact to defraud in illegal card
games persons who had travelled to the State of Nevada.""' The defen-
dant asserted, inter alia, that gambling is legal in Nevada, hence the
two requisite racketeering acts were not proven."6 The court rejected
this argument noting that dishonest gambling is illegal in Nevada as in
every other state.'87 Following United States v. Hawes,"' the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that RICO extends to illegitimate enterprises and affirmed
Morris's conviction. From the facts given, the operation Morris was con-
ducting seems little more than a group of confidence men plying their
trade. It hardly represents traditional notions of infiltration of
legitimate business by "racketeers." In fact, the federal law prohibiting
,82 All of the cases within this section involve section 1962(c) and an attack on
the "enterprise" element of the offense.
18 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
'" Five "marks" testified that on various occasions they were dealt full houses
only to be beaten by four-of-a-kind. One "mark" was dealt four jacks but was
beaten by four kings. Another was dealt a queen high flush but was beaten by a
king high flush. Id, at 438.
532 F.2d at 442.
" Morris was also charged with five counts of interstate travel with the in-
tent to defraud through illegal gambling activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). He
could have been charged under a Nevada law which prohibits use of sleight-of-
hand tricks to defraud which carries a penalty of one to ten years in prison and/or
a maximum $5,000 fine. NEV. REV. STAT. § 465.070 (1978). See requisite state of-
fenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), supra note 181.
187 531 F.2d at 442.
19 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
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syndicated gambling would not apply since only three people were in-
volved.'89
In United States v. Swiderski,9 ° the two defendants were indicted for
the sale of cocaine which occasionally took place at Sylvester's
Restaurant, owned by defendant Swiderski. Most of the evidence stem-
med from the sale of three ounces of cocaine on November 10, 1976, to
five different people at three different sites, one being Sylvester's.' A
second sale of one gram of cocaine was consummated one month later
with the sister of one of Swiderski's restaurant employees; this sale
took place in a second floor room of the building which housed the
restaurant. A third sale was made to an undercover agent at Sylvester's
on January 6, 1977.19 Swiderski was charged with violating RICO sec-
tion 1962(c), the enterprise being Sylvester's which "was not only en-
gaged in the food business, but also being used as a cover or front for
the illegal trafficking of cocaine."'9 3 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the convic-
tions, citing United States v. Altesel' for the proposition that the il-
legitimate as well as legitimate aspects of Sylvester's were covered by
the statute.
The problem with the court's reasoning is that it sees Sylvester's as
the connection with legitimate business necessary to rationalize the ap-
pliction of RICO. However, the enterprise at issue here is the illicit sale
of cocaine. There is little evidence of any connection between the
business of selling cocaine and the business of selling food. There is no
evidence that the monies derived from the drug sales were invested in
Sylvester's, thereby justifying indictment under section 1962(a). 95 With
the exception of McGowan, a co-defendant, and Logay, the undercover
agent, both of whom frequented the restaurant, there is no evidence
that sales were made to other restaurant customers, nor was there
in See notes 165-68 supra and accompanying text.
593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"' On November 10, 1976, Swiderski met two couriers who were transporting
cocaine from New York to Washington. He inspected four, one-ounce packages on
the third floor of the restaurant building where he kept his business records.
Later, all three left with co-defendant McGowan and went to the house of a pro-
spective buyer where McGowan purchased '/2 an ounce and the buyer also pur-
chased 1/2 an ounce. The four then drove to a health spa in Virginia where two
employees purchased one ounce. Upon their return to Sylvester's, one of the
restaurant employees also purchased an ounce. Id. at 1247-48.
" The agent allegedly worked undercover during the entire period, yet only
the three instances of sales are reported. Another cocaine dealer allegedly
delivered cocaine to Swiderski twice a week for a period of about one year, but
his testimony is not expanded upon in the opinion. Id. at 1248.
'93 1&
'% 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub. nom., Napoli v. United States,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
IN See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
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evidence that Swiderski attempted to procure potential drug buyers
from his restaurant clientele.' In addition, not all of the drug sales
were made at Sylvester's. The only reason the restaurant proved to be
a suitable location for some deals was because Swiderski happened to be
there.
Accepting the Swiderski court's reasoning leads to the conclusion
that anytime two underlying offenses are committed on the premises of
a business engaged in interstate commerce, RICO can be invoked. If this
were true, the jewelry store owned by Adams in the Sutton case con-
stituted the requisite "enterprise."'9 7 In addition, the sale of about four
ounces of cocaine to seven different people over three months can hardly
be characterized as syndicate infiltration of the retail drug business.
The third and possibly most disturbing misuse of RICO sanctioned by
a court is shown by United States v. Aleman.'" In Aleman, the defen-
dants were convicted of operating an "illegitimate enterprise" whose
sole purpose was to rob homes, then "fence" the stolen goods to turn a
profit.'" Only three robberies were actually committed over a period of
about one year. The first robbery occurred on September 16, 1972,
following a meeting between Aleman, Foresta, Almeida,2" and two
others at a Chicago bar, the Survivor's Club. It was believed by the
defendants that a large amount of cash was in the targeted home.
Foresta and Almeida were selected to actually conduct the break-in.
Aleman provided the keys to a stolen car plus the address of the home.
During the robbery, Foresta threatened the owner with a gun, then tied
her up along with a fourteen-year-old babysitter. After thirty minutes of
ransacking the rooms, the robbers left with some cash and jewelry.
They returned to the club where Aleman paid them $500 each for their
burglary services.
The second robbery did not occur until January, 1973, again following
a meeting at the Club. It was believed that a doctor in Indianapolis kept
a large sum of money in his home. Foresta and Almeida were once more
selected to conduct the robbery. Aleman provided the two with the ad-
dress plus a sheriffs badge to be used as a ruse to gain entry. At the
doctor's home, the two used the badge to push their way past the maid
I" If in fact the restaurant had been closely related with the illegal drug
operation, why did the government not require forfeiture of Sylvester's under
RICO section 1963(a)(2)? The opinion only indicates that the defendants received
substantial jail terms. 593 F.2d at 1247.
'" See note 23 supra (assuming the jewelry store was engaged in interstate
commerce).
19 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id at 302.
Almeida was an unindicted co-conspirator and his testimony was used to
supplement the testimony of the victims. The defendants did not testify in their
own behalf and their defense consisted mainly of efforts to impeach Almeida and
discredit eyewitness identification. Id.
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who was the only person present. She was threatened with a gun and
then tied up. The two robbers searched the home for about an hour
before leaving with $35,000 in cash, jewelry and furs. Using the maid's
car in the get-away, the two joined up with some of Aleman's friends.
All four then returned to Aleman's Chicago home. Foresta and Almeida
were again paid $500 each for their services."'
The third robbery occurred in November, 1973, after a similar pre-
robbery planning session. This last target home was in Chicago and the
objects sought were gold coins. This time, however, Aleman and
another man joined Foresta and Almeida in committing the robbery.
The four again used the sheriff's badge to gain entry and then struck
the owner over the head with a gun. They then tied up the owner and
his wife. After searching for one hour, the thieves left with various
items worth $6,500, but the gold coins were not discovered. Aleman and
Foresta were indicted under section 1962(c), conspiracy,2"2 transporting
stolen goods, and various firearms offenses. Upon conviction, Aleman
and Foresta each received thirty year prison terms.2"3
The disturbing point is not that the defendants were convicted or that
they received stiff prison terms, rather it is the use of RICO against two
ordinary bandits who committed three robberies in over one year. The
case is devoid of any element of infiltration of a legitimate business, and
the defendants can hardly be characterized as members of "organized
crime." The court justifies the application of RICO by stating that
"[plerhaps given more time, their business would have successfully
grown into a conglomerate at the expense of their victims, but for-
tunately for the public the defendants were put out of business. "204
However, this statement holds true for any conspiracy. Clearly, this
alone cannot justify the use of RICO, with its extraordinary penalties,
as a substitute for traditional state criminal law. This case is a realiza-
tion of the fears expressed by the Sutton majority. Its facts almost
directly parallel the Sutton majority's extreme example of abuse involv-
ing the two bank robberies.2 '
Although the three previous cases illustrate the courts' acquiescence
in prosecutorial abuse of RICO, this again seems to be the exception
rather then the rule. For example, a cautious district court in United
201 One of Aleman's two friends, Miroff, attempted to "fence" the stolen goods
but the customer was a federal undercover narcotics agent. As a result, most of
the goods and cash were recovered in a search of the home where they were
stored. Id
See, note 50 supra.
' 609 F.2d at 301 n.3 and 4. The government allegedly filed a petition for
Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 and offered
to prove that Aleman had participated in five murders. The petition was ap-
parently denied though the trial court did consider the issue. Id. at 311 n.18.
Id at 305.
605 F.2d at 266.
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States v. Moeller"°' dismissed a RICO count which alleged that the
defendants conducted an enterprise "as a group of individuals
associated in fact for the purpose of burning and destroying
buildings.""2 7 Throughout the existence of the "enterprise" only one
building was burned. The other racketeering act was the kidnapping of
three plant employees during the arson offense. 08 Significantly, both the
arson and kidnapping offenses were state crimes.2"9 In response, the
court while commenting on RICO's supplanting of state criminal law
stated, "Congress may have the power to extend federal criminal
jurisdiction that far into areas normally handled by the states, but it
should take clear indication of legislative intention before such a sweep-
ing purpose is attributed to it."2 '
Similarly, in United States v. Dennis,"' a RICO count was dismissed
where the defendant allegedly conducted the affairs of an "enterprise"
through the collection of unlawful debts. The defendant was an
employee of General Motors Assembly Division and had allegedly lent
money to co-workers at usurious interest rates. The alleged
"enterprise" affecting interstate commerce was General Motors. Ob-
viously, there was no nexus between the defendant's loansharking ac-
tivities and the activities of General Motors. As a result, the RICO
count was properly dismissed.212
All of these cases indicate that RICO has occasionally been used in an
arguably repressive manner against individual defendants. Whether
this can be beneficial is not considered here. These cases are merely of-
fered to illustrate RICO's potential for abuse stemming from its am-
biguous language and its uncertain court-defined parameters.
C. Solutions
The difficulty in assessing the value of RICO's application to il-
legitimate enterprises is that there are beneficial as well as deleterious
aspects to be weighed. Anyone familiar with the Sutton "enterprise"2"'
402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
Id at 57.
See note 181 supra.
402 F. Supp. at 57.
210 Id at 59.
2 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
212 See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978). This same reasoning was used by the Seventh Circuit in revers-
ing a RICO conviction where the defendants operated a gambling casino in the
basement of a recreation hall of a mobile home park. The court concluded that
"[tlhe Government's case must fail because a total want of proof of the connection
between the racketeering activities and the affairs of Maple Manor, Inc.
Geographical juxtaposition of the enterprises is insufficient." Id. at 852.
"1 605 F.2d, at 263; see notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
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has the "gut-feeling" that the defendants should be jailed, yet the same
individuals may view the court's stance in Aleman" ' as repressive. This
ambivalence results in two lines of decisions. In cases like Altese21' and
Rone, 16 the courts simplistically and unequivocably state that the
statute was designed to include illegal enterprises. The other line,
represented by Sutton, states the opposite finding that illegal enter-
prises are not within the statute's scope, citing the legislative history as
support. The first line's expansionist view can result in abuse, while the
second line's restrictive view can result in a nugatory statute.
It has been shown that the statute is pregnant with potential for
abuse. Any federal prosecutor, so inclined, can adapt the statute to vir-
tually any fact pattern. Actually, this is not surprising since the
statute's application was designed to be flexible.
One solution to cure this over-breadth and assure that RICO is not ap-
plied in a repressive manner is to rewrite it. By strictly delineating the
statute's scope, the courts are relieved of the burden of justifying the
application of RICO to illegitimate "enterprises," a justification that fre-
quently relies on superficial arguments to achieve a desirable result.21'
This solution also prevents courts from being forced to take "maverick"
positions, like the Sutton majority, when confronted with these shallow
assertions. One commentator has suggested limiting the statute's scope
to financial crimes over $100,000 or felonies involving personal injury.218
The problem with narrowing the statute is that it makes the case
against the announced target, organized crime, more difficult.
Another possible solution is to limit the statute's application solely to
organized crime figures. Although it is questionable whether member-
ship in organized crime can be a statutory element and still pass con-
stitutional muster,219 like obscenity it is arguable that the courts and the
Justice Department will know organized crime when they see it.2"' If a
preliminary hearing were held to determine whether the defendant
should be charged under RICO, the defendant's rights could be effec-
tively protected from prosecutorial abuse.
Certainly there are other solutions which can be offered, but with all
things considered, the best solution in limiting RICO's abusive nature is
the one already theoretically employed.22" ' Presently, the federal pro-
214 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979); see notes 197-204 supra and accompanying text.
215 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor., Napoli v. United States,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
216 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
217 1&
218 See Atkinson, supra note 24, at 18.
219 See notes 155-59 supra.
o See note 156 supra.
See Note, The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized
Crime. 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 496. 507 (1970).
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secutor has primary responsibility in assuring the non-abusive applica-
tion of RICO. Each Strike Force should be equipped with detailed rules
and guidelines to determine in which instances RICO should be invoked.
A centralized committee within the Justice Department should review
all indictments paying particular attention to the federal-state balance.
Also, investigative agencies should integrate efforts with the Justice
Department to assure maximum allocation of resources. Thus, federal
investigative efforts will not be wasted on cases where a RICO indict-
ment will not ensue because state prosecution is preferred. Most of
these internal review procedures are already in operation, either for-
mally or informally2 22 but much still depends on the good faith of the
prosecutor.
When the prosecutor's zeal replaces his better judgment, the courts
assume the responsibility of checking abusive use of the statute and
placing the system back in perspective. This supervisory role of the
courts explains the Sutton holding. Surely, the Sutton majority knew of
the expansionist trend currently in vogue when it held contrary to five
other circuits. Although the case, at least superficially, seems to lack an
abusive character, it is significant in that it points up the power courts
generally wield in controlling prosecutorial discretion. As a specific
deterrent, it puts zealous prosecutors on notice that their case may be
thrown out when intentional abuse occurs; as a general deterrent, it
reminds everyone that parameters exist even though they are unar-
ticulated. It is open to speculation why the majority did not articulate
these parameters, as suggested by the Second Circuit."' Perhaps the
Sixth Circuit felt that this task would best be accomplished by the
Supreme Court, and by holding contrary to all other circuits, the ques-
tions of RICO's scope could be forced upon the Court for speedy resolu-
tion just as the Sixth Circuit had forced clarification of the Hobbs Act. 4
I See In re Subpoena of Perisco, 522 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Note,
supra note 28.
1 See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979). See also notes
172-73 supra and accompanying text.
I' The Sutton dissent analogizes the majority's limitation of "enterprise" to
the Sixth Circuit's limiting of the Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). In United
States v. Yokley, 542 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1976), two defendants broke into the
home of the manager of a Detroit K-Mart store. One defendant held the
manager's family hostage while the other accompanied the manager to the store
where the safe was emptied. Since the store was engaged in interstate com-
merce, the defendants were charged with violent interference with commerce
under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, commonly referred to as the Hobbs Act or the anti-
racketeering statute. The district court dismissed the racketeering counts of the
indictment holding that the Hobbs Act applied only to corrupt labor practices.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed even though it held the Hobbs Act was not limited to
labor activities. In reasoning which parallels Sutton, the court held that the
Hobbs Act was not designed to change the federal-state balance where a simple
robbery of a discount store would be more suitably prosecuted under Michigan
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Viewed in this light, the Sutton decision may be more a blessing than an
obstacle since final determination could be forthcoming.
IV. CONCLUSION
Critics of RICO take the simplistic approach that the statute should
be limited, in accord with the Sutton majority, or scrapped altogether.
Many factors result in this strong temptation to accept the Sutton deci-
sion. RICO's potential for abuse has been realized in selected instances.
The statute's legislative history points to a restricted use. The recogni-
tion that the statute really only provides heavier penalties once the two
underlying offenses are proven, indicates that the statute does not
make new conduct criminal, but, instead, merely results in an "ag-
gravated" form of existing crimes. All of these factors result in ques-
tioning the need for RICO, or at least in favoring the clear, decisive
reasoning of the Sutton majority.
Proponents of RICO take the opposite view that to limit the statute
to conform to the Sutton holding allows criminal activities to go un-
punished. In addition, the restrictive holding contravenes the broad
remedial purpose for which the statute was enacted: to serve as an affir-
mative weapon against organized crime.
It seems clear that the Sutton majority is making a statement about
abuse of RICO. The court sought to reverse the statute's incursion into
state criminal law enforcement; it sought to criticize its colleagues in
five other circuits for their superficial reasoning; and most importantly,
it sought to warn federal prosecutors of the inherent potential for abuse
within the statute. 5
But Sutton goes too far. It cuts off the statute's foot to cure a
law. In effect, the Yokley court required "racketeering" before the statute could
be invoked just as the Sutton court required a legitimate enterprise. The Yokley
interpretation was rejected in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978),
where the Court did not require proof of "racketeering" as an element of the
crime. (It should be noted that "racketeering" is not mentioned in the Hobbs Act,just as "legitimate" is not mentioned in RICO). In Culbert the Court placed
strong reliance on the statutory language. Obviously, the Sutton dissent is offer-
ing this analogy as a foreshadowing of the result the Supreme Court will reach
should Sutton be appealed.
" There is also a pragmatic side of Sutton's restrictive holding which tends to
make it more palatable. Because RICO requires at least two underlying criminal
offenses to establish a "pattern," RICO section 1961(5), the defendants are sub-
ject to penalties for these underlying acts in addition to penalties on the RICO
counts. In Sutton, each defendant was convicted of at least one drug offense and
some were convicted of many of the other offenses, hence the defendants are not
totally escaping criminal liability. The Sutton holding is not "opening the jail
doors." In addition, federal prosecutors are not left without weapons to fight "il-
legitimate enterprises." They may still resort to conspiracy law (18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976)) or, as in this case involving drug offenses, the "Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise" statute (21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976)).
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hangnail. As indicated, the courts are already beginning to recognize
the statute's abuse potential.' As this awareness increases, the courts
will fashion rules to regulate RICO prosecutions. In addition, the lesson
from Sutton will not go unlearned by the Justice Department. It is
unlikely that the Department will jeopardize existing legitimate pro-
secutions by abusing the statute and run the risk of another draconian
interpretation by a court following Sutton. Also, the Department will
become more proficient in the statute's use as time progresses, thereby
utilizing the extraordinary remedies of forfeiture and divestiture
against legitimate organized crime targets.
The trend toward more effective prosecutorial use of RICO seems to
be on the horizon now. The various Strike Forces are making inroads in-
to bastions of organized crime.' It must be recognized that the statute
is in its infancy and thus needs time to grow. Eventually, it should be
successful in attaining its goal, the prevention of infiltration of business
by racketeers, but should something go awry, the warning of Sutton can
always be resurrected.
WILLIAM GORENC
See notes 174-79 supra and accompanying text.
The Justice Department's manual on RICO, DEP'T JUST. MANUAL, note 43
supra, abstracts the cases where indictments are proposed by each Strike Force.
Although some may arguably include illegitimate enterprises, the targets at
least seem to involve Mafia connections. For example: the Brooklyn Strike Force
is investigating a large scale loansharking operation involving the Evola La Cosa
Nostra family; the Chicago Strike Force has uncovered an interstate auto parts
operations supplied by stolen car rings; the Cleveland Strike Force is in-
vestigating a massive real estate fraud scheme involving local La Cosa Nostra
members; the Detroit Strike Force is investigating numerous investments by
reputed La Cosa Nostra members in legitimate businesses in and around Detroit
(some cases involve killings to gain control); the Los Angeles Strike Force is in-
vestigating a million dollar acquisition of International Monetary Fund assets
through threats and violence by La Cosa Nostra members; the New Orleans
Strike Force is investigating the take-over of a night club by two high echelon La
Cosa Nostra members; and the New York Strike Force is investigating the in-
filtration of the city's garment district by organized crime figures. DEPT JUST.
MANUAL, note 43 supra.
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